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State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered
Thirty-six states' have enacted statutes that regulate tender offers2
for corporations maintaining certain contacts with the regulating
state.3 Tender offers are also subject to federal regulation under the
Williams Act; 4 thus, an offeror may have to satisfy both state and
federal requirements before proceeding with an offer. This two-tier
system of tender offer regulation is necessary, according to proponents
of the state laws, in order to protect fully the shareholders of the
target 5 company.6
There has been almost universal agreement among commentators, 7
1. See notes 28 & 29 infra (listing statutes).
2. A tender offer is conventionally defined as a public solicitation of the shareholders
of a corporation to tender their shares to the offeror at a specified price, see E. ARANOW
& H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 70 (1973); Note, The Developing
Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REv.
1250, 1251-52 (1973), although more expansive definitions have been employed, see
Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972); E. ARANow, H.
EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1-34
(1977); Note, supra, at 1275-81. For an analysis of the mechanics and tactics of a tender
offer, see E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra, at 10-63, 219-76; A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS:
DEFENSES, RESPONSES AND PLANNING (1978); 1 J. FLOm, M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKE-
OVERS AND TAKEOuTs-TENDER OFFERS AND GOING PRIVATE 9-107 (1976); Fleischer & Mund-
heim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 317 (1967).
3. See p. 515 infra.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i), 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976).
5. The target company is the corporation the securities of which are or will soon be
the subject of a tender offer. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1601(e) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
For a discussion of the characteristics of a potential target company, see E. ARANOW & H.
EINHORN, supra note 2, at 1-9.
6. See, e.g., Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legislation:
The Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 722, 723 (1970); Vorys, Ohio Tender
Offers Bill, 43 OHIo B. 65 (1970). Several commentators have explained that the Williams
Act did little to restrain high pressure tender offers, known as "blitzkriegs" or "Saturday
Night Specials," even though such offers "effectively deprived both management and
stockholders of the target company of the opportunity to respond intelligently to a
tender offer ... and that shareholders were being stampeded to accept questionable or
inadequate offers because there was often insufficient time to obtain a higher offer."
Arsht, The Delaware Takeover Statute-SPecial Problems for Directors, 32 Bus. Ltw.
1461, 1461 (1977); see Bartell, The Wisconsin Takeover Statute, 32 Bus. LAw. 1465, 1466
(1977); Robinson, Directors Under Attack in New 'Bear Hug' Mergers, N.Y.L.J., June 12,
1978, at 41, col. 1.
7. E.g., Langevoort, State Tender Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects and Political
Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213 (1977); Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State
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however, that most of these state laws are both preempted by the
Williams Act and repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitu-
tion.8 In Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell,9 the Fifth Circuit
recently relied on both of these arguments and invalidated the Idaho
tender offer statute.10 This is particularly significant since it is the
first case in which a federal court has ruled on the constitutionality of
a state tender offer law. Consequently, the decision casts serious doubt
on the validity of the thirty-five other state tender offer statutes.
This Note reevaluates the constitutionality of the state tender offer
laws. Its basic premise is that both courts and commentators have been
too quick to conclude that the state laws are preempted, or wholly void
under the commerce clause. The Note argues that the state tender offer
laws are not preempted by the Williams Act. This conclusion is based,
in part, on Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,11 in which the Supreme
Court stated that the sole purpose of the Williams Act is investor pro-
tection. The state laws are entirely consistent with this purpose and
thus are not preempted by the federal legislation. The Note also
demonstrates that although the state statutes do impose some improper
burdens on interstate commerce, many of the features of these laws
represent responses to valid state concerns and do not conflict with
the commerce clause. The Note proposes an analysis that assesses the
individual components of these laws and their effects on the tender
offer process, and concludes that certain modifications should be made
so that the state statutes can continue to fulfill their intended role
within the limitations of the commerce clause.
Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1976); Note, Com-
merce Clause Limitations upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. CAL. L. REv.
1133 (1974). Much of this literature seems to be prompted by opposition to the state laws
on policy grounds.
8. The preemption doctrine is derived from the supremacy clause of the Constitution:
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218 (1947); THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (A. Hamilton). See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 357-67 (9th ed. 1975).
The commerce clause provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3; see, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949). See generally G.
GUNTHER, supra, at 278-356.
9. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978) (aff'g 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977)). For dis-
cussion of the lower court's opinion, see Balotti, The Delaware Tender Offer Statute,
3 DEL. J. CORP. L. 230 (1978); Note, Supremacy and Commerce Clause Limitations on
State Regulation of Tender Offers, 42 ALB. L. REv. 492 (1978).
10. IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1513 (Supp. 1978).
11. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
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I. The Scope of Tender Offer Legislation
Those who claim that the state laws are invalid assert that they con-
flict with the objectives of the federal Williams Act and impermissibly
obstruct the making of tender offers. Supporters of the state statutes,
on the other hand, argue that the laws merely supplement the mini-
mum requirements imposed by the William Act. Thus, it is appro-
priate to consider the federal response to tender offers and then out-
line the operation of the state acts before turning to the constitutional
questions.
A. The Williams Act
The Williams Act amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of
193412 were adopted in order to assist investors confronted with a cash
tender offer in making an informed decision about whether to tender
their shares.13 Proponents of the Williams Act claimed that a share-
holder of a target company required extensive information about the
terms and conditions of the offer and the identity and plans of the
offeror; without such information, it was argued, the shareholder could
not make an educated choice between tendering his stock at the offered
price or refusing the offer and assuming the risk of a possible change in
corporate control.' 4 Prior to the passage of the Act in 1968, the cash
tender offeror was not required to disclose either its identity or its
plans.' 5 The enactment of the Williams Act closed this significant gap
in the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws. 16
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
13. See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975); Full Disclosure of
Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings on S.510 Before
the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 188 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; S. RrP. No. 550, 90th Cong., Ist Sess.
2-4 (1967).
14. See Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus.
LAw. 149, 150-52 (1966). Cohen, then chairman of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Securities and emphasized the need
for legislation to "provide the investor, the person who is required to make a decision,
an opportunity to examine and to assess the relevant facts." Hearings, supra note 13, at 15.
15. Although proxy contests for corporate control were regulated by § 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976), and exchange offers were
subject to the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77h, 77j (1976), cash tender offers remained conspicuously outside the ambit of federal
securities regulation. See H.R. RaP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1968]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2814; S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1967);
Sowards & Mofsky, Corporate Take-Over Bids: Gap in Federal Securities Regulation, 41
ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 499 (1967).
16. See S. RrP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967) (Williams Act will "correct the
current gap in our securities laws').
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The most important provisions of the Williams Act are those now
codified in sections 13(d)l7 and 14(d)18 of the Securities Exchange Act.
Both are intended to provide shareholders with the information neces-
sary to evaluate the merits of a tender proposal. These sections require
detailed and timely disclosures both when significant acquisitions by
an individual or group increase the possibility of a takeover attempt
and when an actual tender offer is made. Section 13(d) requires that
within ten days after acquiring beneficial ownership of five percent of
any class of equity securities registered under Section 12 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act, 19 a person must file a Schedule 13D 20 with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Schedule 13D must
disclose inter alia: the purchaser's identity and background; the amount
and source of funds for the purchase; the extent of the purchaser's
holdings in the target; and, if the purpose of the purchases is to acquire
control of the corporation, any plans to liquidate, merge, or make any
other major changes in the target's business or corporate structure.
Section 14(d) provides that a person making a formal tender offer
must file a Tender Offer Statement Schedule 14D-121 and publish or
send to the shareholders of the target corporation the relevant facts it
contains. The Schedule 14D-1 includes the same information as the
Schedule 13D and requires additional information regarding the of-
feror's source of funds and its plans or proposals, disclosure of any past
negotiations or transactions with the target company, and financial in-
formation about the offeror when such information is material to the
offer.22 The offeror must also disclose any antitrust or other legal con-
flicts relating to the tender offer if such information would be material
to the target company's shareholders in deciding whether to tender
their shares.23
In addition to these disclosure provisions, the Act attempts to assist
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976).
18. Id. § 78n(d).
19. A corporation with assets of at least $1,000,000 and over 500 shareholders and any
corporation whose securities are traded on a national exchange must register under § 12.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976).
20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1977).
21. 42 Fed. Reg. 38,341 (1977) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100).
22. Section 14(e) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976), requires the offeror to
disclose all other material facts. For a discussion of materiality in the context of a proxy
contest, see TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) ("An omitted fact
is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would con-
sider it important in deciding how to vote.")
23. 42 Fed. Reg. 38,341 (1977) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100). The target
company is subject to the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act if it attempts to
persuade its shareholders either to accept or to reject the offer or if it purchases its own
shares during the course of the tender offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4 (1977).
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tendering shareholders by providing them with certain substantive
protections during the course of the offer. It requires that tendering
shareholders be permitted to withdraw their tendered stock 24 during
the first seven days following publication of the offer, or after sixty
days if the offeror has not already purchased the tendered shares.25 In
addition, if the offer is for less than 100% of the target's shares, all
shares tendered during the first ten days must be purchased on a pro
rata rather than a first-come, first-served basis.2 6 Finally, any sub-
sequent increase in the offered price must also be paid to those share-
holders who have already tendered their stock.27
B. State Regulation
Virginia enacted the first state tender offer statute in March 1968,
four months prior to the passage of the Williams Act.28 Thirty-five
states have followed suit,29 adopting laws that impose tender offer
24. A tendering shareholder must deliver his shares together with a properly executed
"Letter of Transmittal" to the offeror's designated depositary or forwarding agent. The
Letter of Transmittal, which is drafted by the offeror, requires the shareholder to repre-
sent that he can lawfully sell the shares and that the offeror will acquire clear and un-
restricted title. In addition, the offeror often requires: identification of the tendered
shares by their certificate numbers, the name and address of the shareholder and instruc-
tions for payment of the purchase price or return of any shares not accepted, the
signature of the registered owner, and the signature of the authorized guarantor when
the tender does not occur simultaneously with the deposit of the share certificates. See E.
ARANOW & H. EINHCRN, supra note 2, at 59-60.
25. Williams Act § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1976).
26. Id. § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976). The Williams Act does not explicitly
require the offer to remain open for any length of time. However, it effectively creates
a 7- to 10-day minimum offering period by providing that all tendered shares may
be withdrawn during the first 7 days of the offer and that all shares tendered during the
first 10 days must he purchased on a pro rata basis. The Antitrust Improvements Act, 15
U.S.C. § 18a (1976), requires that certain offers remain open for 15 days and that certain
others remain open for 30 days.
27. Williams Act § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1976).
28. VA. CODE §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (1978) (effective Mar. 5, 1968).
29. AIASKA STAT. §§ 45.57.010-.120 (Supp. 1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1264 to
1264.14 (Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51.5-101 to -108 (Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 36-347a to -347m (1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 517.35 to .36 (Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1901 to -1915 (1977); HAWAII
REV. STAT. §§ 417E-1 to -15 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1513 (Supp. 1978); Act of
Sept. 8, 1977, Pub. Act 80-556, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2, § 137.5-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1978); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-3-1 to -12 (Burns Supp. 1978); Iowa Uniform Securities Act
§§ 502.102, .211-.215 (1978), retprinted in IA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) O 18,142, 18,161-165;
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1276 to -1285 (1974); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 292.560-.991 (Supp. 1978);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1500-:1512 (WVest Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§§ 801-817 (Supp. 1978); MD. CORP. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 11-901 to -908 (Supp. 1977);
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 110C, §§ 1-13 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978); MieH. COMP. LAws
ANN. §§ 451.901-.917 (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01-.13 (West Supp. 1977);
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-72-1 to -23 (Supp. 1978); Mo. Take-Over Bid Disclosure Act,
1978 Mo. LAWS S.B. No. 820, reprinted in 2 BLUE SKY L. RaP. (CCH) ( 28,201-214; NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 21-2401 to -2417 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 78.376 to -.3778 (1973); N.H. REV.
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regulations that often differ from those prescribed by the Williams
Act. The purpose of these acts is generally claimed to be to provide
protection to shareholders of target companies in addition to that
provided by federal tender offer regulations."°
Although the state acts often vary significantly in their terms, it is
nevertheless possible to outline their general characteristics. 31 Nearly
all of the state laws regulate tender offers for corporations incorporated
under the laws of the state and most apply to offers for corporations
that have substantial assets or a principal place of business in the
state.32 If the target company comes within the statutory jurisdictional
requirements, the offeror is subject to the regulating state's law in its
transactions with shareholders living both inside and outside the state.33
This extraterritorial effect is designed to prevent the offeror from cir-
cumventing the requirements of a particular state by omitting the
residents of that jurisdiction from the offer.3 4
The acts typically impose both disclosure and substantive require-
ments on the offeror. Some state statutes require the offeror to supply
the applicable securities agency with information similar to that dis-
closed in the Schedule 13D filed under the Williams Act.33 Several
STAT. ANN. §§ 421-A:I to :15 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:5-1 to -19 (West Supp. 1978);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. IAw §§ 1600-1613 (McKinney Supp. 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78B-I to -11
(Supp. 1977); Osno REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page 1978); 70 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1978); S.D. CoP. LAws ANN. §§ 47-32-1 to -47 (Supp. 1978);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-2101 to -2114 (Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-1 to -13
(1978); Wis. STAT. ANN §§ 552.01-.25 (west Special Pamphlet 1978); Tex. Administrative
Guidelines for Minimum Standards in Tender Offers 065.15.00.100-.800, reprinted in 3
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 46,615.
30. The Ohio General Assembly, for example, declared that the purpose of the Ohio
law is "[t]o protect shareholders of Ohio and Ohio based corporations by requiring public
announcement and fair, full, and effective disclosure to shareholders in regard to take-
over bids." 1969-70 Ohio Laws 352 (1969) (statute codified at OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1707.041 (Page 1978)).
31. See generally E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 2, at 207-17;
Langevoort, supra note 7, at 219-40; Vaughan, State Tender Offer Regulation, 9 REV. SEC.
REG. 969 (1976); Wilner & Landy, supra note 7, at 3-9.
32. See E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 2, at 234-36 (table of state
statutes indicating jurisdictional requirements). Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(2)
(Supp. 1977) (incorporated in state) with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-2m (West Supp. 1978)
(incorporated or principal place of business or substantial assets in state) and N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 1601(a) (McKinney Supp. 1978) (incorporated, or principal place of business
and substantial assets in state).
33. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-1506(l) (Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1278 (1974) (both
requiring that tender offer be made to regulating state's shareholders on same terms offer
is made to shareholders living in other states). See generally E. ARANOW & H. EINUORN,
supra note 2, at 161-62.
34. If a state only regulated offers made to its residents, an offeror could avoid com-
plying with the state's takeover regulations by not soliciting shareholders in that state.
See note 110 infra; E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 2, at 157.
35. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51.5-104 (Supp. 1976); MD. CoPp. & Ass'NS CODE ANN.
§ 11-902 (Supp. 1977) (both requiring offeror to file same information disclosed under
Williams Act).
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states, however, require much more extensive disclosures.30 These
filings must be made anywhere from ten37 to sixty31 days before the
offer can become effective, thus affording the target company's man-
agement advance notice of the impending takeover bid.3 9 In addition,
the state agency that regulates securities is usually empowered to order
a hearing on its own motion and, in many instances, must do so at the
request of the target.40 The majority of states limit such hearings to
the issue of whether an offeror has made full and fair disclosure;4'
however, several statutes also allow questions of an offer's substantive
fairness to be raised before the securities agency.42 If an offeror has
failed to satisfy the state's requirements, he may be enjoined from
proceeding with the offer.43
The state statutes, like the Williams Act, also address the substantive
terms of the tender offer. The statutes impose various requirements as
to the minimum and maximum offering period,44 the withdrawal
rights of tendering shareholders, 45 and the time during which an
offeror must accept all shares tendered on a pro rata basis.46
36. New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania, for example, require an offeror to make dis-
closures concerning its capital structure, any pending legal or administrative proceedings
involving the offeror or any of its subsidiaries, and its financial statements for the current
and three preceding years. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1603 (McKinney Supp. 1978); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041B(3) (Page 1978); 70 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 75 (Purdon Supp.
1978); see E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 2, at 212-13, 219.
37. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 11.51.5-104(l) (Supp. 1976).
38. E.g., HAWAI Rav. STAT. § 417E-3(f) (1976). Most states require a 20-day waiting
period. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 1602 (McKinney Supp. 1978); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 1707.041(B)(1) (Page 1978).
39. E. ARANoW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 2, at 217.
40. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36-347e (1977); IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(4) (Supp. 1978). The
right to demand a hearing allows management to postpone further the effective date of
the offer. See E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 2, at 217-18, 220.
41. E.g., 70 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 74(d) (Purdon Supp. 1978); see E. ARANOW, H.
EINHORN & G. BERSTMIN, supra note 2, at 216.
42. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-4 (West Supp. 1978); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 552.05(5) (West
Special Pamphlet 1978).
43. See, e.g., Ohio v. Imetal, Inc., No. 75 Civ. 09-3868 (C.P. Franklin County, Ohio
Oct. 9, 1975) (temporary restraining order issued at request of Ohio Division of Securities);
E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 2, at 216-17.
44. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2) (Supp. 1977) (20-day minimum, no maxi-
mum); MICH. Co.tP. LAws ANN. § 451.905(2) (Supp. 1978) (60-day minimum, no maximum);
VA. CODE § 13.1-530(a) (1978) (21-day minimum, 35-day maximum); see E. ARANOW, H.
EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 2, at 213-14.
45. E.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 11-51.5-103(l)(c) (Supp. 1976) (during first 15 days and
after 35 days from announcement of offer); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(3) (Supp. 1977)
(during first 20 days of offer); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-9a (West Supp. 1978) (until three dals
prior to announced termination of offer); see E. ARANoW, H. EINHORN & G. BERtsrEIN,
supra note 2, at 214-15.
46. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(3) (Supp. 1977); IDAHO CODE § 30-1506(3) (Supp.
1978) (during first 10 days of offer); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3-5(b) (Burns Supp. 1978)
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II. Statutory Preemption
It is often claimed that the state tender offer statutes purposely im-
pose a variety of burdens on offerors in an attempt both to discourage
takeover bids for local companies and to protect incumbent manage-
ment.47 The additional disclosure requirements, it is argued, represent
a burden in themselves. 4s Moreover, the state acts greatly increase the
possibilities of delaying the initiation of an offer.49 Delay redounds to
the benefit of the target company's management by depriving the
offeror of the advantage of surprise and by providing the target with
time to take action to resist the offer.50 Finally, the additional require-
ments imposed by the state acts expand the number of legal grounds
on which an offer can be resisted. 51 The hearing procedures in some
state acts are regarded as particularly onerous for offerors because they
can lead to long delays and because they can provide a target with a
convenient forum for raising various objections. 52
The burdens that the state statutes impose on offerors create a
serious possibility that the acts are preempted by the Williams Act.
Commentators have asserted that the state acts are decidedly proman-
agement because they fail to balance the competing interests of the
offeror and the target's management; thus the acts may conflict with
(during entire offer); see E. ARANOw, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 2, at 215.
Hawaii requires that any offer must be for 100% of the outstanding shares of the target,
thus eliminating the need for any pro-rata purchase provisions. HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 417E-2(3) (1976).
47. See Corporate Takeovers: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1976) (statement of SEC Commissioner Loomis)
[hereinafter cited as Loomis Testimony]; Wilner & Landy, supra note 7, at 18-19; Note,
supra note 7, at 1159. The Kentucky bill specifically stated this purpose: "An Act
relating to the prevention of take-over bids through the purchase of corporate securities."
1976 Ky. Acts 534 (statute codified at Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 292.560-.630 (Supp. 1976)).
48. See Brudney, A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RuTrcEs L. REv. 609, 624
(1967) ("The very process of providing additional information operates-and is intended
to operate-to increase the cost and to diminish the chances of success of the outside
bidder, by enhancing the opportunity for incumbents to divert tenders from him.")
49. See Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1278 (5th Cir. 1978);
E. ARANow, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIn, supra note 2, at 217-18, 220. See generally
Langevoort, supra note 7, at 238.
50. The target company's management can resist the tender offer in a variety of ways.
The company may recommend that shareholders reject the offer, issue shares to friendly
persons, purchase its own shares, increase the dividend paid, declare a stock dividend,
commence litigation against the offeror, make an acquisition that creates antitrust or
regulatory problems, or seek out a defensive merger or competing tender offer. I J. FLom,
M. LIPTON & E. STEINIERGER, supra note 2, at 94-107.
51. See E. A.ANow, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSrEIN, supra note 2, at 220. See generally
Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. L.w. 1433 (1977).
52. See E. APANow, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 2, at 215-18; Langevoort,
supra note 7, at 231-32; Wilner & Landy, supra note 7, at 9-10.
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the federal policy of even-handed regulation.13 In Kidwell the court
sounded a similar note, holding that the Idaho statute was preempted
because it disrupted the neutrality of federal tender offer legislation.54
Preemption, however, is a highly complex issue; a careful, detailed
analysis of both the federal and state regulatory schemes is required
before a state act can be held to be preempted. This is particularly
true in light of recent decisions by the Supreme Court. The Court, has
been highly solicitous of state interests when considering preemption
questions.55 It has also exhibited a tendency to limit federal involve-
ment in the specific field of securities and corporate lawY56 As a result,
courts and commentators should be much more hesitant in declaring
that widely enacted securities statutes like the state tender offer acts
are preempted by federal legislation.
The tests that a court should apply in determining whether a state
act is preempted by parallel federal legislation are well established. 7
First, a state statute will be preempted if Congress has expressly de-
clared its intent to exclude the states from a particular area of regula-
tion.58 Second, a state law will be invalidated if a congressional intent
to preempt parallel state regulation can be inferred. 9 A court will infer
preemptive intent if the federal regulation is so pervasive that it leaves
no room for state supplementation,00 or if the federal interest in a field
53. E.g., Loomis Testimony, supra note 47; Langevoort, supra note 7, at 246-54; Note,
supra note 7, at 1167-70; see Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420,
437 (N.D. Tex. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978).
54. Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1279-80 (5th Cir. 1978); see
note 81 infra (discussing Fifth Circuit's holding).
55. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (Ohio trade secret
law not preempted by federal patent law); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973) (stock exchange employment termination rule enacted pursuant
to Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not preempt conflicting California statute); Note,
The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 623, 639-54 (1975).
56. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (breach of fiduciary
duty by majority shareholders does not violate § 10b of Securities Exchange Act of 1934);
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (private damages action
under SEC Rule lOb-5 confined to actual purchasers or sellers of securities). In Santa
Fe, the Court declared that "[a]bsent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are
reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with
transactions in securities." 430 U.S. at 479.
57. But see Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978).
58. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (Federal Warehouse Act
expressly preempts all concurrent state regulation).
59. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146-52 (1963);
Hirsch, Toward A New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515, 529-33; Note,
Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV.
208-10 (1959).
60. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (pervasive
federal regulation of aircraft noise preempts local noise controls); Cloverleaf Butter Co.




is so dominant that the states must be precluded from enforcing laws
on the same subject.61 Third, even in the absence of express or inferred
preemption, federal legislation will preempt any concurrent state reg-
ulation that "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. '"62 There are thus
three recognized types of preemption: explicit, implicit, and opera-
tional.
A. Explicit and Implicit Preemption
A careful application of these principles reveals that the state
statutes are not preempted by the Williams Act. Congress has not ex-
plicitly indicated an intent to preempt state regulation of tender offers
either in the Williams Act or in its legislative history. 63 In the absence
of any such explicit congressional declaration, preemptive intent may
be inferred from the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme.6 4
But the Williams Act is not analogous to those comprehensive federal
statutes that have been held to preempt parallel state legislation. 65 The
61. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (alternative holding) (dominant
federal interest in sedition and national security precludes Pennsylvania sedition law);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (controlling federal interest in foreign affairs
creates presumption of federal preemption of Pennsylvania alien registration act).
62. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637,
649 (1971).
63. It has been suggested that § 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(a) (1976), which states that "[n]othing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction
of the securities commission . . . of any State . . . insofar as it does not conflict with the
provisions of this chapter," indicates that Congress implicitly accepted the prospect of
concurrent federal and state tender offer regulation. This suggestion is reinforced by
the failure of the Williams Act to make any explicit statement about preemption. See F.
MCCAFFREY, STATMORY CONSTRUCTION 164-67 (1953) (original act and amendment con-
strued as one law).
Courts, however, often treat this type of saving clause as inapplicable to the preemption
question. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 501 n.10 (1956); Hirsch, supra
note 59, at 538-41; Note, sufra note 59, at 211-15. Moreover, as the Fifth Circuit
recognized in Kidwell, the general problem of how much attention a court should pay to
a saving clause is compounded by the fact that § 28(a) was adopted in 1934 and was ad-
dressed to state blue sky laws, and not to tender offer laws. Great Western United Corp.
v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1275 n.39 (5th Cir. 1978); see Hirsch, supra note 59, at 540
(questioning whether court should apply saving clause to statutory amendment enacted
by later Congress). Accordingly, the entire argument against statutory preemption cannot
rest on § 28(a). It is clear, however, that there is no explicit language in any federal
securities legislation that itself preempts state tender offer laws. Furthermore, § 28(a) at
least arguably creates a presumption against preemption.
64. See Hirsch, sutbra note 59, at 529-33; Note, supra note 55, at 625.
65. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) ("It
is the pervasive nature of the scheme of federal regulation . . . that leads us to conclude
that there is pre-emption.") One commentator has relied upon the Court's holding in
Burbank to assert that the Williams Act is also so comprehensive that it allows for no
supplemental state regulation. Note, supra note 7, at 1164-66. The Williams Act, however,
unlike the Federal Aviation Agency regulations considered in Burbank, is not a detailed
and comprehensive regulatory scheme; nor is it so pervasive that stricter state rules are
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Williams Act is essentially a minimum disclosure statute6 and does
not attempt to deal with all aspects of a tender offer. The statute also
does not depend on exclusivity for the effective protection of share-
holders. In addition, even if it is assumed that the Williams Act is a
pervasive regulatory scheme, the Supreme Court has recently held
that preemptive intent cannot always be inferred from the "compre-
hensive character" of a federal law.67
A court may also infer a congressional design to preempt parallel
state legislation when Congress acts in an area of dominant federal
interest, even if the federal legislation is not pervasive. But the federal
interest in the securities markets is not dominant; it is not comparable,
for example, to the paramount federal interest in foreign affairs or
national security, two areas in which the Supreme Court has rejected
concurrent state legislation.6" State securities laws have traditionally
stood alongside federal securities regulation, providing "a second line
of protection" for investors. 9 Thus, the absence of a dominant federal
interest in securities regulation, evidenced by the long-recognized state
role in this area, makes it inappropriate to infer that the Williams Act
precludes state regulation of tender offers.
necessarily incompatible with the federal regulations. The Act simply sets out minimum
disclosure standards for offerors. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 248. In addition, the
Court was particularly concerned in Burbank that local legislation affecting airline
schedules would lead to a "concomitant decrease in safety." 411 U.S. at 639. There is no
similar public safety issue in the tender offer context that would compel a finding of
federal preemption.
66. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 2-4 (1967).
67. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359-60 (1976) (comprehensiveness of Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act does not necessarily require preemption of California alien em-
ployment statute); New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415 (1973)
(preemption not inferred from comprehensive federal work incentive provisions); Head v.
New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1963) (comprehensive nature of
federal regulation under Federal Communications Act does not preempt state regulation
of radio advertising).
68. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504-07 (1956) (national security); Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (foreign affairs). In each of these cases, the Court ex-
pressed the sentiment that the state laws in question affected areas that were of vital
importance to the entire nation.
69. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R.
Doc. No. 95 (pt. 4), 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 734 (1963) ("There has not been and should not
be Federal preemption in the field of securities regulation.") The Supreme Court has
found that "Congress, in the securities field, has not adopted a regulation system wholly
apart from and exclusive of state regulation," Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 137 (1973), and has held that "under the securities laws state
regulation may co-exist with that offered under the federal securities laws," SEC v.
National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 461 (1969). See Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501,
504-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (federal securities laws are "incomplete and interstitial" and only
supersede state corporate law when there is direct conflict).
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B. Operational Preemption
When preemption is neither explicit nor implied, state law may
nonetheless be preempted if it conflicts with the operation of the
federal statute or produces results inconsistent with the purposes and
objectives of Congress.70 This judicial determination requires a two-
step analysis: the court first must construe the two statutes and then
must decide whether they in fact conflict.7 1 The incompatibility of the
two laws must be clear, however, to justify the invalidation of state
regulation when Congress has not explicitly or implicitly prohibited
the states from acting.72
The Supreme Court recently construed the Williams Act in Piper
v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,73 a case involving the narrow question
of whether a defeated offeror had standing to sue for money damages.
Chris-Craft and the SEC both argued that in enacting the Williams
Act, Congress sought to establish a policy of evenhandedness in tender
offer regulation.7 4 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, emphati-
cally responded that "Congress was indeed committed to a policy of
neutrality in contests for control, but its policy of evenhandedness does
not go... to the purpose of the legislation .... Neutrality is, rather,
but one characteristic of legislation directed toward a different pur-
pose-the protection of investors." 75 The Chief Justice recognized that
"[t]he sponsors of this legislation were plainly sensitive to the sugges-
tion that the measure would favor one side or the other in control con-
tests; however, they made it clear that the legislation was designed
solely to get needed information to the investor."7 6
The legislative history of the Williams Act supports the Chris-Craft
70. Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61, 64 (1954) (state's suspension of
common carrier's right to use highways impermissibly disrupts federally authorized
activities); Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 541-42 (1945) (Florida law pre-
scribing qualifications for union officials restricts "full freedom" that National Labor
Relations Act guarantees union members); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)
("Our primary function is to determine whether, . . . Pennsylvania's law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."); see Hirsch, supra note 59, at 526-27.
71. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971).
72. The Court has cautioned that "[w]e must . . . be careful to distinguish those
situations in which the concurrent exercise of a power by the Federal Government and
the States or by the States alone may possibly lead to conflicts and those situations where
conflicts will necessarily arise." Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554 (1973) (emphasis
in original); see Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 US. 1, 10 (1937) (preemption
inferred only when conflict between federal and state law is so direct and positive that
laws cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together).
73. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
74. Id. at 29.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 30-31.
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reasoning. It is devoid of the careful examination of the interests of
the offeror and target management that would have been required in
order to strike an intelligent balance between the antagonists. 77 Rather,
the investor remained "the constant focal point of the committee
hearing."7 8 SEC Chairman Cohen emphasized this orientation in his
testimony before the Senate: "[T]he principal point is that we are not
concerned with assisting or hurting either side. We are concerned with
the investor who today is just a pawn in a form of industrial warfare.
... The investor is lost somewhere in the shuffle. This is our concern
and our only concern."79 Any balance that emerged from the Williams
Act was neither a "purpose" nor an "objective" of its draftsmen, but
rather a byproduct of the congressional desire to "require full and fair
disclosure for the benefit of investors."80 The fact that the state statutes
may alter this balance is therefore an inappropriate basis for statutory
preemption."' Only if state regulation of tender offers conflicts with
77. Cf. Shipman, supra note 6, at 759-60 (Williams Act is not integrated national
policy on takeovers and does not reflect legislative weighing of political and economic
ramifications).
78. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 31 (1977).
79. Hearings, supra note 13, at 178, quoted in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430
U.S. 1, 27-28 (1977) (emphasis supplied by Court).
80. 113 CONG. REc. 24,664 (1967) (Sen. Williams).
81. Cf. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80-82 (1975) (standing denied when based on sub-
sidiary purpose of federal act).
The district court in Kidwell held that the Williams Act preempted the Idaho takeover
statute because the latter destroyed "the careful balance struck in the Williams Act
between the offeror and the management of the target company designed to protect the
interests of the shareholders." Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420,
437 (N.D. Tex. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978); see Langevoort, supra note 7.
at 249; Note, supra note 7, at 1168-70. In affirming the district court's holding, the Fifth
Circuit incorporated this concept of purposive balance, referring to the federal legislation's
"neutral regulatory stance that gives each side of a tender offer an equal opportunity to
persuade the investor." 577 F.2d at 1279. But, in fact, no careful balance between the
offeror and the target management was purposely and affirmatively struck in the Williams
Act. See Shipman, supra note 6, at 759-61 (Williams Act does not strike "carefully con-
ceived balance" and leaves relative strength of management and offeror unchanged);
Crary, Pendulum Has Swung Too Far in Support of Hostile Takeovers, N.Y.L.J., June
12, 1978, at 27, col. 1. Although it is true that Senator Williams sought "to avoid tipping
the scales either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover
bids," 113 CONG. REc. 24,664 (1967) (emphasis supplied), there is a crucial distinction
between a desire to "avoid tipping the scales" and a deliberate attempt to establish a
"neutral" balance between the competing parties.
If Congress did create a careful balance in 1968, it has quite willingly altered it on
several occasions. In 1970, Congress reduced the level of stock ownership that triggers
§ 13d of the Williams Act from 10% to 5%. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1976). This alerts
management to a potential tender offer at an earlier point in time. The Antitrust Im-
provements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976), has further shifted the balance in favor of
management. See note 26 supra. In addition, the new schedule 14D-l, adopted by the
SEC in August, 1977, makes disclosure by offerors more detailed than it had been
previously. See p. 513 & note 21 supra. Professor Shipman argues that "[d]uring such
periods of development and uncertainty about the proper strength of federal regulation,
it seems particularly appropriate to allow the states to perform their laboratory func-
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the true purpose and objective of the Williams Act-investor protec-
tion-should the state laws be held to be preempted.
The state laws have not yet been definitively construed,8 2 but their
basic effects may be discerned with some degree of certainty. These
laws require fuller disclosure than does the Williams Act, 3 tend to
delay tender offers, 4 and generally increase the probability that offers
will be unsuccessful8s None of these effects, however, are incompatible
with the Williams Act's basic objective of investor protection. The
fact that the state laws require additional disclosures does not con-
stitute a conflict; fuller disclosure tends to increase investor protection
by providing the investor with more information on which to base his
decision. 0 This promotes the policy of the Williams Act; it certainly
does not contradict it.
It is unclear whether delay injures or benefits investors in the target
company. It is possible that the prospect of delay, together with the
opportunity this gives incumbent management to raise defenses, might
convince a potential offeror to refrain from making a tender offer,
thereby depriving shareholders of the opportunity to tender their stock
at a premium. This proposition, however, is entirely speculative;
despite the growing number of state statutes, the use of the tender offer
as a technique for seeking corporate control has "virtually exploded."87
tion." Shipman, supra note 6, at 760 (footnotd omitted). See generally New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (federal system allows
states to try novel social and economic experiments).
82. But see Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1278-79 (5th Cir.
1978) (construing Idaho statute).
83. See p. 516 supra.
84. See p. 517 supra; Wilner & Landy, supra note 7, at 9-10.
85. See p. 517 supra.
86. Cf. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141, 147-48 (1963)
(minimum federal avocado standards may be supplemented by higher state standards
even though state requirements had specifically been rejected by Congress). The Fifth
Circuit took the opposite view in Kidwell, stating that "in the area of financial disclosure
. .. 'less is more'." Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280 (5th Cir.
1978). Simultaneous compliance with the requirements of most state statutes and the
Williams Act is possible without incurring liability. Subcommittee on Proxy Solicitations
and Tender Offers of the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, American Bar
Association, State Takeover Statutes and the Williams Act, 32 Bus. LAw. 187, 191 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT]; Vaughan, supra note 31, at 974.
87. See Mishkin & Nathan, Tender Offers Continue to Surge As New Laws and Cases
Alter Tactics, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 19, 1977, at 30, col. I; id. at 32, col. 2. A practitioner involved
in many tender offers has asserted that there is no evidence that the state statutes have
deterred potential offerors, see Interview with Edwin B. Mishkin, Esq. (Nov. 13, 1977)
(notes on file with Yale Law Journal), and the chief of the SEC's tender offer office has
stated that regardless of the state statutes, the tender offer remains the most popular
means of taking over a company. Appleton, The Proposed Requirements, 32 Bus. LAw.
1381, 1381 (1977). The statistics seem to support these assertions. Although there were
only 269 tender offer bids between 1970 and 1975, there were 132 takeover attempts in
1976 and 181 in 1977. Austin, Study Reveals Trends in Tactics, Premiums, Success Rates
in Offers, N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1978, at 25, col. 5.
The Yale Law Journal
It is more likely that the main effect of delay is to benefit the in-
vestors in the target company. A longer offering period reduces the
panic atmosphere engendered by tender offers and the concomitant
pressure on shareholders to tender their shares immediately. s8 More-
over, the longer period permits the formation of an auction market for
the target's stock, 9 and thus may allow the target's management to
secure a higher competing bid for investors.90 Finally, to the extent
that the statutes calm the panic atmosphere surrounding tender offers,
the courts may hold target directors to a correspondingly higher duty
to act reasonably and in the best interest of shareholders. 91
The state tender offer statutes may decrease the likelihood that a
tender offer, once made, will be successful. 9 2 But this in no way con-
flicts with the Williams Act, the purpose of which is neither balance
nor neutrality but investor protection. 3 In short, the basic effects of
88. Robinson, supra note 6, at 41, col. 1. It has been stated frequently that the 7- to
10-day offering period provided by the Williams Act, see note 26 supra, is too short for
shareholders to evaluate an offer adequately. Panic selling is said to be the result. By
lengthening the minimum offering period, the state statutes permit a more orderly
evaluation of an offer by investors. E. ARAtNow, H. EINHORN & G. BERLsrEm, supra note
2, at 218-19; see ABA REPORT, supra note 86, at 189, 195-96.
89. See Robinson, supra note 6.
90. See Cheney, Hitchcock Scenario for Takeovers Replaces Shootout at OK Corral,
N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1978, at 33, col. 3. The resulting escalation in the premium offered
has been extremely beneficial to shareholders of the target company. Robinson, supra
note 6; see The Great Takeover Binge, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 14, 1977, at 177 ("The simple
fact is that almost all the companies that have been targets of takeover bids have
eventually been gobbled up, although not always by the original bidder.") As a result,
even if delay defeats the initial offeror, it is likely that a shareholder will have an op-
portunity to tender his stock at an even higher price. In addition, the target company's
stock generally rises toward the tender price once the offer has been announced. Ship-
man, supra note 6, at 758; Wilner & Landy, supra note 7, at 10. Thus, whether or not
the offeror is defeated, the shareholders will benefit from the higher price and increased
market for their securities.
91. Flom, Forcing a Friendly Offer, 32 Bus. LAw. 1319, 1320 (1977); cf. Electronic
Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 948 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly,
J.) (standard of conduct to which participants in tender offer held tempered by fact that
they "act ... under the stresses of the market place").
92. See pp. 517, 523 supra.
93. See pp. 521-22 supra. Several commentators have asserted that the state statutes
conflict with the Williams Act and should be preempted because they impose substantive
requirements that differ from those prescribed by Congress. See, e.g., E. ARANow, H.
EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 2, at 226-29; Wilner & Landy, supra note 7, at 30-31.
These commentators have failed, however, to define the purpose of the Williams Act
properly. Aranow, Einhorn and Berlstein, for example, suggest that by requiring the
offeror to purchase all shares tendered on a pro rata basis for more than the first 10
days of the offer as required by the Williams Act, the state statutes dilute the rights of
shareholders who tender during the first 10 days. It is asserted that this creates a con-
flict between the federal and state laws. See E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSIEIN,
supra note 2, at 226-27. In addition, the long withdrawal periods provided by the state
statutes are said to conflict with the offeror's federally provided right to treat tenders as
irrevocable between the eighth and sixtieth days of the offer. Id. at 227. But neither of
these state provisions creates any actual conflict with the Williams Act; the offeror can
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state tender offer laws do not disrupt the operation of the federal
statute in any way. There is thus no operational preemption, just as
there is no explicit or implicit preemption. Congress could preempt
these state laws, of course, but it has not yet done so.
III. The Commerce Clause
The state statutes have also been criticized by commentators as
violative of the commerce clause of the Constitution. 94 The tender
offer laws are said to interfere with interstate commerce by disrupting
the national securities markets, by imposing burdensome filing re-
quirements on offerors, by regulating transactions involving share-
holders who live in other states, and by effectively prohibiting the
issuance of national tender offers.05 Supporters of the state laws, how-
ever, argue that these burdens are justified by the states' legitimate in-
terest in investor protection. 96
Although some of the disruptive effects of the tender offer statutes
tend to be exaggerated by the commentators, there can be little doubt
that the state laws do impose substantial burdens on interstate com-
certainly comply with both the federal and state laws simultaneously. More fundamen-
tally, these preemption arguments fail to focus on the Williams Act's single goal of in-
vestor protection. The Act was not designed to protect either shareholders who tender
early or offerors. Rather, it was intended to assist all investors who are confronted with
a tender offer. Thus, these inconsistencies between the federal and state schemes do not
justify judicial preemption of the state statutes. The contention that the state filing re-
quirements conflict with the Williams Act because Congress rejected such provisions, see
Wilner & Landy supra note 7, at 25-29, is similarly unconvincing, given the absence of
evidence that the state regulations have been harmful to the target company's share-
holders.
94. E.g., Wilner & Landy, supra note 7, at 15-23; Note, supra note 7, at 1152-62.
A state law that does not conflict with and is not preempted by a federal regulatory
scheme may nevertheless impose an undue burden on interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (rejecting assertion
that federal regulation completely ousted state regulatory authority but remanding for
determination as to whether law in question unduly burdened interstate commerce);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (rejecting preemption
challenge, but holding statute violative of commerce clause).
95. See Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1283-85 (5th Cir.
1978); E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN. sukra note 2, at 231; Langevoort, supra
note 7, at 242-46; Wilner & Landy, supra note 7, at 15-23; Note, supra note 7, at 1152-62.
96. See, e.g., Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1279, 1283 (5th
Cir. 1978); Memorandum of Defendants at 33, Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell,
439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978). The purpose of
investor protection underlies the state blue sky laws that protect the public from fraud in
the issuance and sale of securities by supplementing the minimum requirements of the
Securities Act of 1933. See L. Loss & E. Cowrrr, BLUE SKY LAWS 17-42 (1958). Investor
protection has long been recognized as a legitimate state goal. See Hall v. Geiger-Jones
Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917) (purpose of Ohio blue sky law "to protect the public against
the imposition of unsubstantial schemes and the securities based upon them" is wholly
within competency of state).
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merce. Nevertheless, careful and detailed commerce clause analysis is
necessary, particularly since commerce clause litigation typically in-
volves complex issues of federalism and statutory interpretation. More-
over, the Supreme Court has recently been reluctant to find conflicts
between state laws and the commerce clause. Although a few statutes
have been struck down,97 several others that clearly affected interstate
commerce have been upheld.98 It would not be unreasonable to con-
clude that the overall pattern of these decisions has favored state
regulation.
The test used by the Supreme Court in determining whether a state
statute violates the commerce clause involves balancing the statute's
impact on interstate commerce and the legitimate state interests served
by the law.99 A statute will generally violate the commerce clause if it
substantially impedes the free flow of commerce between the states or
affects an area of commerce that requires national uniformity. 100 The
Court has explained, however, that "in the absence of conflicting
legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state to
make laws governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in
some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent,
regulate it."1° 1 A state law affecting or regulating interstate commerce
will be upheld if it effectuates a legitimate state interest and if the
burden imposed on commerce does not outweigh the statute's putative
local benefits. 10 2
It is thus necessary to determine whether the burdens imposed by
tender offer statutes on interstate commerce are balanced by any
97. E.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 98 S. Ct. 2531 (1978) (New Jersey statute
prohibiting importation of solid and liquid wastes violates commerce clause); Raymond
Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (Wisconsin law barring vehicles over 55
feet long invalid under commerce clause).
98. E.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 98 S. Ct. 2340 (1978) (Iowa single-factor sales
formula for apportioning net income of interstate corporations, which could result in
taxation of 100% of net income from products sold in Iowa but manufactured outside
state, does not violate commerce clause); Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 98 S. Ct. 2207 (1978)
(upholding Maryland statute prohibiting producers or refiners of petroleum products
from operating service stations in state).
99. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441 (1978) (commerce clause
inquiry "necessarily involves a sensitive consideration of the weight and nature of the
state regulatory concern in light of the extent of the burden imposed on the course of
interstate commerce"); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371-72 (1976)
(when statute promoting legitimate state interest also burdens interstate commerce Court
"is confronted with a problem of balance"). See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 8, at
308-56 (summarizing evolution of balancing approach).
100. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945).
101. Id.
102. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1960). The extent of the burden that will be
tolerated depends, in part, upon whether the local interest could be promoted as well
with a lesser impact on interstate commerce. 397 U.S. at 142.
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legitimate state interests. This does not mean, however, that the com-
merce clause test must be applied to each state statute taken as a whole,
as other commentators have apparently assumed.oa The state laws con-
sist of various components, and the validity of these components under
the commerce clause differ. If the balancing test were applied to a state
tender offer statute in its entirety, the burdens might well outweigh
the benefits. This would lead to the statute's invalidation and the
consequent elimination of the benefits it affords shareholders. It is
therefore preferable to apply the commerce clause analysis to the
separate provisions of the state statutes. 04 Such an analysis of the state
statutes indicates that if certain burdensome provisions were elimi-
nated, the statutes could continue to protect investors without violating
the requirements of the commerce clause. The analysis thus suggests
possibilities both for a more focused judicial review of the tender offer
statutes'0 5 and for state legislative reform.
The most objectionable feature of the state tender offer laws is their
extraterritorial coverage.' 0 6 The extraterritorial reach of these statutes
enables a state to control transactions between nonresident offerors and
nonresident shareholders.107 Extensive state regulation of interstate
103. See Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1285-86 (5th Cir.
1978); Wilner & Landy, supra note 7, at 21-23; Note, supra note 7, at 1152-62.
104. Since 1917 when the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the blue sky
laws, see Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917), few attempts have been made to
have an entire securities statute invalidated. In a number of cases, however, a particular
clause or section has been struck down. E.g., Mulhern v. Gerold, 116 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass.
1953) (blue sky provision providing substituted service of process upon nonresidents with
no requirement of notice held unconstitutional); Miller v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 7 Cal.
2d 31, 59 P.2d 1024 (1936) (requirement that state but not national banks secure permit
before issuing certain securities violated state and federal guarantees of equal protection);
see L. Loss & E. CowET, suPra note 96, at 13-17; cf. Wright, Correlation of State Blue
Shy Laws and The Federal Securities Acts, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 258, 294 (1941) (arguing that
constitutionality of blue sky provisions should be evaluated independently).
105. A federal court may be limited in its ability to declare some provisions of a state
statute unconstitutional while affirming the legitimacy of others. The Supreme Court
has explained that an otherwise Valid provision of a state statute can only be treated as
separable from the unconstitutional elements of the law if "it appears both that, standing
alone, legal effect can be given to it and that the legislature intended the provision to
stand, in case others included in the act and held bad should fall." Dorchy v. Kansas, 264
U.S. 286, 290 (1924). The job of determining the state legislature's intent, "like the usual
function of interpreting a state statute, rests primarily upon the state court." Id. Several
of tender offer statutes, however, include severability clauses, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-18
(West Supp. 1978); N.Y. Bus. CoRu'. LAW § 1613 (McKinney Supp. 1977); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 1707.041(I) (Page Supp. 1977), that would enable a federal court to conclude that
the state legislature intended the various provisions of the statute to stand or fall in-
dividually. For a general discussion of the problem of severability, see P. BATOR, P.
MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEMs 196-200 (2d ed. 1973).
106. See p. 515 supra.
107. This extraterritorial effect distinguishes the tender offer statutes from the state
blue sky laws, which the Supreme Court has long recognized as fulfilling the valid state
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commerce is permissible only if such regulation effectuates a legitimate
state interest. 08 However, it is difficult to identify any interest sup-
porting extraterritorial control; 109 a state cannot claim that it has an
interest in protecting nonresidents and in regulating transactions that
take place outside the state.1 0 It seems more likely that the extra-
territorial reach of these statutes is intended to insulate local target
companies from takeovers, thereby preventing the possible liquidation
or relocation of corporate assets and the consequent loss of local
revenue and employment."' Such a purpose, however, is clearly illegit-
imate. The Supreme Court has held that a statute may not be enacted
solely to protect local economic interests."12
purpose of investor protection. See note 96 supra. Blue sky laws apply only to intrastate
transactions, a fact stressed by the Court in its decision upholding the constitutionality
of the Ohio blue sky law. See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 557-58 (191 7) (com-
merce clause challenge rejected because blue sky laws "apply to dispositions of securities
within the State") (emphasis in original). In addition, several commentators have sug-
gested that state regulation of an offer by a foreign corporation to nonresident share-
holders may violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. State jurisdic-
tion over an offer depends primarily upon the relationship between the target company
and the state. See p. 515 & note 32 supra. Accordingly, the offeror or the offer may
not have sufficient contacts with the regulating state to justify the state's exercise of
jurisdiction. See E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. B.RLSTEIN, supra note 2, at 231-32. This
objection would be inapplicable to state tender offer statutes that only regulate sales
involving resident investors, because such a limitation on the scope of the statute ensures
that the transaction is adequately connected to the regulating state.
108. See p. 526 & note 102 supra.
109. But see Shipman, supra note 6, at 744-45 (arguing that extraterritorial regulation
by target company's state of incorporation is justified by state's right to regulate corpora-
tion's internal affairs). Shipman's attempt to draw an analogy between tender offers and
classical internal affairs transactions such as proxy contests and mergers has been
criticized by several commentators. See, e.g., Wilner & Landy, supra note 7, at 16-17; Note,
supra note 7, at 1153-55.
110. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935) ("New York has no
power to project its legislation into Vermont by regulating the price to be paid in that
state for milk acquired there"). The extraterritorial regulation of interstate commerce
cannot be justified on the ground that the laws of a regulating state could otherwise be
circumvented by excepting the residents of that state from the offer. See p. 515 & note
34 supra. In Baldwin, the Supreme Court dealt with an analogous question. The New
York statute under review was intended to promote the economic welfare of New York's
milk farmers and the quality of the milk consumed by the state's residents. New York
regulated the price paid to farmers in Vermont for milk that was to be sold to con-
sumers in New York in order to keep the New York regulatory scheme unimpaired by
competition from neighboring states. Although the Supreme Court accepted the under-
lying purpose of the New York law, see Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), it never-
theless found the statute unconstitutional because of its extraterritorial reach. 294 U.S. at
519, 521-23.
Even if an offeror avoided the shareholders of a particular state, those shareholders
could still tender on the open market at only a fraction less than the tender price. See
E. ARANOW & H. EINUORN, supra note 2, at 157-58.
Ill. See, e.g., Wilner & Landy, supra note 7, at 18-19; Note, supra note 7, at 1159.
112. Boston Stock Exch. v. Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977) (quoting Dean Milk
Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951)) ("Permitting the individual States to enact laws
that favor local enterprises at the expense of out-of-state businesses 'would invite a mul-
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The basic state interest in securities regulation is the the protection
of resident shareholders.' 13 State tender offer regulations can permis-
sibly promote this legitimate local interest only if they are limited to
the protection of state residents and the regulation of essentially intra-
state transactions. Such limitations would allow the states to satisfy the
fundamental commerce clause requirement of a local interest while
alleviating the impact of the statutes on interstate commerce. 114
Even if this modification were implemented, it would still be neces-
sary to determine which of the state provisions actually protect in-
vestors or further other legitimate state interests without unduly
burdening interstate commerce. Disclosure requirements and regula-
tions designed to provide shareholders with adequate time to consider
offers are the most clearly acceptable features of the state statutes.
These provisions do not impose an excessive burden on interstate
commerce. Complying with numerous disclosure laws may be a tedious
and time-consuming process" 15 but this type of compliance is not un-
like what corporations are required to do in order to make a national
stock offering."" In addition, different states require essentially the
same information;"17 thus, multistate disclosure requirements should
not impermissibly disrupt tender offers. Similarly, providing residents
of different states with different offering periods may be painstaking
and bothersome, but it is not an insurmountable obstacle for an of-
tiplication of preferential trade areas destructive' of the free trade which the Clause
protects."); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 13 (1928) (Louisiana may
not* prohibit interstate movement of raw shrimp in attempt to favor local packing
industries).
Even if a legitimate local purpose is found for the extraterritorial reach of the state
statutes, significant burdens are still imposed on an offeror by the inevitable conflicts
between the regulations of the several states that may assert jurisdiction over an offer.
For example, Hawaii requires that an offer remain open for no more than 35 days,
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 417E-2(I) (1976), but Massachusetts demands that an offer remain
open for a minimum of 60 days, MAss. ANN. Lws ch. 110C, § 7 (Michie/Law. Co-op
Supp. 1978). Thus it is doubtful that the extraterritorial provisions could survive the
commerce clause balancing test.
113. See p. 525 supra.
114. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 2, at 157 (effect on interstate commerce
would have been minimal if states had followed traditional blue sky approach); E.
AkNow, H. EINHORN & G. BaaR.siEN, supra note 2, at 231 (statutes might be constitutional
if they regulated only local incidents of interstate commerce).
115. See E. ARANow, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra.note 2. at 220.
116. See L. Loss & E. Cowmr, supra note 96, at 89-95; Millonzi, Concurrent Regula-
tion of Interstate Securities Issues: The Need for Congressional Reappraisal, 49 VA. L.
REV. 1483, 1489 (1963); Wright, supra note 104, at 275-76. The complexity involved in
making a national stock offering has also led to numerous, although unanswered, calls for
federal preemption of state blue sky laws. See Cowett, Federal-State Relationships in
Securities Regulation, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 287, 290 (1959); Millonzi, supra, at 1498-99.
117. E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERISTEIN, supra note 2, at 212.
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feror.11 Whatever burden is imposed on commerce by these various
provisions is certainly not excessive in relation to the enormous benefits
of eliminating the pressure on shareholders to make hasty, unin-
formed decisions when confronted with "Saturday Night Special"
tender offers119 and of ensuring that resident shareholders have the
opportunity to receive the full value of their stock from either the
initial or a later offeror. 20
State regulations that deal with pro rata purchase requirements also
would not be unduly burdensome since they impose no additional
administrative expenses on the offeror beyond those associated with
the offering period requirements. 12' Moreover, these regulations also
seem to be aimed at investor protection. They generally extend the
period during which the offeror must purchase all shares on a pro rata
basis'122 and thereby assure the shareholder that his stock will not be
rejected by the offeror because the desired number of shares has al-
ready been tendered. 23 Thus, these regulations, like those that extend
the minimum offering period, decrease the pressure on shareholders
to tender immediately and permit a more orderly evaluation of tender
proposals.124 It seems likely, then, that these provisions also satisfy
the commerce clause balancing test.
The state regulations addressed to shareholder withdrawal rights are
more problematic. They would impose substantially the same ad-
ministrative burdens on the offeror as would the minimum offering
period and pro rata purchase requirements, but they might also in-
crease the offeror's uncertainty in evaluating the likelihood of the
offer's success. 125 However, there is a definable benefit provided share-
holders by these provisions that could constitute a legitimate state pur-
118. The primary effects of these provisions would be to require the offeror to struc-
ture the offer differently in different states. The offeror could accomplish this by includ-
ing in all tender offer solicitations a reference to the various offering periods available to
residents of the different states and by treating all tendered shares accordingly. The over-
all effect, however, would be to increase the offeror's administrative costs.
119. See note 88 supra.
120. See p. 524 supra.
121. See note 118 supra.
122. See p. 516 supra.
123. See E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLsrEIN, suPra note 2, at 215.
124. See note 88 supra.
125. Many offers are structured so that the offeror is not obligated to purchase any
shares unless a predetermined percentage of the target's stock is tendered. Multiple and
inconsistent state withdrawal regulations, however, many of which permit withdrawal for
most of the offering period, see note 45 supra, may make it difficult for the offeror to
predict how many shares will remain available for purchase in the coming weeks. Thus,
an offeror may find it difficult to evaluate his overall chances for success in the midst of
the tender offer and to decide whether to change the terms of the offer or to discontinue
the offer altogether and minimize the expenses associated with a takeover attempt.
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pose. Extended withdrawal periods benefit unsophisticated share-
holders who often tender early, in contrast to more experienced in-
vestors who typically tender as late as possible in the hope of profiting
from a higher competing offer.126 The protection of unsophisticated
investors is certainly a desirable objective;127 however, the benefits
derived from the provision of extended withdrawal rights are not as
widespread as those that result from the disclosure and offering period
requirements, which benefit all resident shareholders. Thus, it is
probable that these provisions would not survive the commerce clause
balancing test.
Other state statutory provisions more clearly violate the commerce
clause because they tend to impose a greater burden on interstate
commerce and are less justifiable on the basis of the states' interest in
shareholder protection. Those state statutes that allow the target to
demand a hearing are particularly troublesome. 28 The target's man-
agement could invoke these provisions to obstruct a national tender
offer endlessly; 12 9 the prospect of fifty simultaneous hearings might
well deter most offerors. Moreover, such hearings are unlikely to
provide much protection for shareholders. It is the target's manage-
ment that initiates the challenge, and management's goals are likely to
be different from those of shareholders, particularly at the time of a
tender offer.130 It would thus be fundamentally inconsistent with the
requirements of the commerce clause to permit the target company to
challenge the adequacy of the offeror's disclosures in numerous state
proceedings.'3'
State tender offer regulations that require that the target company's
management be given advance notification of the impending offer also
seem to be more protective of management than of shareholders.' 3 2
This warning period may be used by management to develop and
126. See ABA Report, supra note 86, at 195.
127. Cf. NEVADA LEGISLATIVE COMM'N OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL BUREAU, CONSUMER
PROTECTION BULLETIN No. 91, at 12-15 (1970) (discussing need for state legislation to
protect unsophisticated consumers).
128. See p. 516 supra.
129. See note 40 supra.
130. The jobs of the target company's executives are generally threatened by a tender
offer for the company. See Wilner & Landy, supra note 7, at 18-19. Thus, although the
shareholders may relish the opportunity to tender their stock at the offered price, man-
agement may use the state statutes and the hearing provisions to thwart the offeror. See
E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 2, at 265-66. But see E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G.
BERLSTEIN, supra note 2, at 82 (promises of future employment may give management an
interest in success of offer).
131. Of course, state regulators would not be limited in their ability to protect share-
holders' interests if an offeror failed to comply fully with the state's requirements. See
p. 516 supra.
132. See p. 516 & note 39 supra.
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implement a defensive strategy in order to defeat the offeror.13 3 If
management is successful, the offer may never become effective, and
shareholders will not have the opportunity to tender their stock.13 4
Since protecting incumbent management is an illegitimate state pur-
pose, it is unlikely that the advance notification requirements com-
port with the requirements of the commerce clause.
Conclusion
The decision in Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell'3 suggests
that any state tender offer statute that strikes a balance between the
offeror and incumbent management different from that reached by the
Williams Act is preempted. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Congress
deliberately chose to maintain a neutral stance in the regulation of
tender offers and that the Idaho statute was preempted because it
disrupted this neutrality. 3 6 The court failed to recognize, however,
that the "sole purpose" of the Williams Act is to protect investors;1 37
unless a state tender offer law conflicts with this congressional objec-
tive it is not preempted. Since there is little evidence to suggest that
the state acts operate to the detriment of investors, these acts are ap-
parently valid under the supremacy clause.
The Fifth Circuit also held that the Idaho takeover law violated the
commerce clause; 13 8 and, taken as a whole, the Idaho statute may in-
deed be unconstitutional. Yet the states do have a legitimate interest in
protecting their investors, and not all of the state regulations are
necessarily invalid under the commerce clause. To ensure that its
tender offer statute is constitutionally permissible, a state must consider
each regulation individually and determine first, whether it effectuates
a legitimate state interest, and second, whether its putative benefits
justify the burden it imposes on interstate commerce. By eliminating
those provisions that fail to satisfy these fundamental requirements, a
state can constitutionally protect resident shareholders who are con-
fronted with a tender offer.
133. See p. 517 supra.
134. For example, the target may arrange a defensive merger or block the offer in
the courts before its shareholders are given a chance to tender their stock. See note 50
sut2ra.
135. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978).
136. Id. at 1279-80.
137. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1977).
138. 577 F.2d at 1286.
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